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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present a game theoretic model of voluntary group in collec-
tive action and to consider dynamic stability of group formation by applying the stochastic
evolutionary game theory introduced by Young (1993) and Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).
The problem of collective action is formulated as a standard model of an n-person prisoner’s
dilemma game with heterogeneous players. We focus our analysis on how the heterogeneity
of individuals’ preferences affects the formation and dynamic stability of group in collective
action.
In many real situations, individuals differ in their willingness to participate in a collective
action. For example, some individuals are concerned very much with environmental pollution,
and they are willing to contribute for anti-pollution movements even if they have a small
number of followers. On the other hand, there are other types of individuals who are reluctant
to participate in such a collective activity. They might contribute for anti-pollution only if
a large number of people have already done so. In this paper, we consider the following
questions. What kinds of groups are formed in the collective action problem with heterogeneous
individuals? Does a group consist only of individuals with higher willingness for collective
action, or does it include many types of individuals? If many kinds of groups are possible,
which one is stable in the long run?
The process of group formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, individ-
uals decide independently to participate in a group or not. In the second stage, participants
negotiate about collective action in their group. Cooperation must be agreed by all partici-
pants. If the agreement is reached, all members of the group take cooperative actions, bearing
some group costs. Any non-member is allowed to free ride. If the agreement is not reached, the
group is not formed and the noncooperative equilibrium of the n-person prisoner’s dilemma
prevails.
Every individual’s incentive to cooperate is characterized by the minimum size of group
in which participation can make him better off (even with bearing the group costs) than the
noncooperative equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma. In this paper, we call this positive
integer the individual’s threshold of cooperation. Individuals with smaller thresholds have
higher motivation to cooperate. It is shown that a group is formed in the Nash equilibrium
of the second stage game if and only if the group size exceeds every member’s threshold of
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cooperation. Such a group is called successful.
By solving backward the two-stage game, the first stage game is reduced to the following
n-person game in strategic form, which we call the group formation game. All individuals
decide independently to participate in a group or not. The group is formed if and only if it
is successful. The group formation game itself presents a model of collective action, which is
different from the original n-person priosoner’s dilemma. All individuals have binary choices
(cooperate, participate, contribute, or not). Neither action dominates the other. The game has
a payoff structure similar to the two-person chicken game. The discrete public good model by
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) is a special case of it. In their model, there is a critical number
of contributors for producing the public good, and all individuals have the same threshold of
cooperation.
It is shown that the group formation game has many strict Nash equilibria. The non-
participation is a strict Nash equilibrium when participation costs exist regardless of the success
or failure of a group. In all other strict Nash equilibria, successful groups are formed with free
riders possibly coexisting. An equilibrium group satisfies the property that every member is
critical in the sense that her opting out makes the group unsuccessful. Equivalently, we can
show that an equilibrium group has two stability property: No single member wants to opt out
(internal stability), and no single outsider wants to join in (external stability).
In the second part of the paper, we apply the adaptive play model due to Young (1993,
1998) to the group formation game. Our main objective is to identify which group is stable in
the long run when individuals play the group formation game in an adaptive way. To set the
stage, we first show that the group formation game is acyclic. This implies from the result of
Young (1993) that adaptive play (without mistakes) converges to a Nash equilibrium. We then
examine the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria in the adaptive play with mistakes. To make
the analysis transparent, we focus our attention on the group formation game with exactly two
types of individuals. The first type consists of individuals who might cooperate even if some of
the others do not. Specifically, it is assumed that they share a common threshold, and that it is
strictly below the number of all individuals. The second type consists of individuals who have
lower motivation to cooperate. Specifically, cooperation is optimal for a second type individual
only if all the others do. In this game, there are three strict Nash equilibria: No cooperation,
the full cooperation, and the partial cooperation, in which only the first types participate. In
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the partial cooperation equilibrium, the second types do not cooperate but benefit from the
first types’ cooperation. That is, they are free riding. In contrast, the first types never free
ride in equilibrium. Because of this, we call the second types potential free riders.
It turns out that the long run equilibrium is either partial cooperation or full cooperation
when the participation cost is small. There are two critical factors in determining the long run
equilibrium: the number of potential free riders and the distribution of incentives among them.
Interesting enough, they affect the outcome in a lexicographic way. We first show that if the
number of potential free riders exceeds a critical level, then the partial cooperation is a unique
long run equilibrium. In other words, when there are “large” number of potential free riders,
the free riding equilibrium is the stable outcome regardless of the distribution of incentives
among them. When the number of potential free riders is “small,” in contrast, the distribution
of incentives matters. Specifically, it is shown that the stochastic stability selects a (version
of) risk dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) in such a case. The intuition behind
this result is that, when there are not too many potential free riders, the group formation
game can be regarded as a coordination game among them. Therefore the selection outcome
is determined by risk dominance. The following version of risk dominance relation is relevant
here. Since preferences are heterogeneous, the incentives to free ride differ, even among the
potential free riders. In particular, there are the strongest and the weakest free riders, who
have the largest and the smallest incentives to free ride, respectively. For each equilibrium, the
Nash product of deviation losses is computed involving only the two distinguished individuals.
An equilibrium risk dominates the other if the Nash product of the former exceeds that of the
latter. In simple terms, the stable outcome is determined by the balance of the largest and the
weakest incentive to free ride.
Since the seminal work by Olson (1965), the group formation in collective action has been
extensively studied. The group size effect, argued by Olson, that larger groups are less success-
ful in organizing collective action is not necessarily true in our model. The success of collective
action critically depends upon the benefit and cost for each individual to participate. We show
that the diversity of individual incentives to cooperation may enable the largest group in col-
lective action easier than in a homogeneous case, while it causes the multiplicity of equilibrium
groups. Although thresholds of cooperation play an important role in the analysis, our model
is different in an important way from other “threshold” or “critical mass” models (Schelling
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1978, Granovetter 1978, Oliver and Marwell 1988). These models presume a simple behavioral
rule on the part of individuals, in that they participate in collective action if and only if the
number of participants exceeds their thresholds. In contrast, we investigate group formation
games in which individuals behave strategically. That is, even if the number of participants
exceeds their thresholds, they do not necessarily participate, since the best response in such a
situation might be to free ride. Our analysis is also related to a recent work by Diermeier and
van Mieghem (2000) who study a dynamic stochastic process of collective action in Palfrey and
Rosenthal’s (1984) model of public goods. Working in a homogeneous population setup with
a log-linear choice rule, they formulate the dynamic model of collective action as a a birth and
death process and characterize its limit distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the group formation game from
the n-person prisoner’s dilemma. Section 3 characterizes its strict Nash equilibria. Section
4 reviews the stochastic stability theory a` la Young (1993), and then shows that the group
formation game is acyclic. Section 5 analyses the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria in the
group formation game with two types. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. Appendix
collects proofs that are omitted from the main body of the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an n-person prisoner’s dilemma defined as follows. Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set
of players. Every player i ∈ N has two actions, C (cooperation) and D (defection). Player i’s
payoff is given by
ui(ai, h), ai = C,D, h = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
where ai is player i’s action and h is the number of other players who select C. We make the
following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The payoff function of player i (= 1, ..., n) satisfies:
(1) ui(D,h) > ui(C, h) for every h = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
(2) ui(C, n− 1) > ui(D, 0),
(3) ui(C, h) and ui(D,h) are increasing in h.
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This assumption is standard in the literature of an n-person prisoner’s dilemma (Schelling
1978) except that players are “heterogeneous” in the sense that they have different payoff
functions. The heterogeneity of players is critical to the analysis of this paper. Property (1)
means that every player is better off by choosing defection than cooperation, regardless of
other players’ actions. This implies that every player has an incentive to free ride on others’
cooperation. Thus, the action profile (D, · · · , D) is a unique Nash equilibrium of the game. On
the other hand, property (2) says that if all players cooperate, they are all better off than at
the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Property (3) means that
the more other players cooperate, the higher payoffs every player can receive, regardless of her
action. The cooperative action by each player gives positive externality to all others’ welfare.
The prisoner’s dilemma game describes an anarchic state of nature in which players are free
to choose their actions. In such a situation, a natural outcome of the game is the Nash equilib-
rium in which no players cooperate. There have been a huge body of literature which consider
how self-interested individuals voluntarily cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma situations. To
escape from the state of noncooperation, some suitable mechanisms for preventing opportunis-
tic behavior are needed. The literature has considered the roles of diverse mechanisms such
as morals, convention, norm, long term relationships, evolutionary selection, informal groups,
organizations, law, etc. In this paper, we consider the voluntary creation of a group in which
participants negotiate to cooperate.
The rule of group formation is defined as a two-stage game.
Participation decision stage: Every player i (= 1, . . . , n) decides independently whether or
not to participate in a group. Participation takes small costs, say, for phone calls, mails and
transportations. The participation cost is denoted by a small positive value εi (> 0). Let S
be the set of all participants, and let s = |S|, where |S| is the number of elements in set S. If
s = 0 or s = 1, then no group is possible.1
Group negotiation stage: All participants negotiate about their cooperation according to
the unanimity rule. They decide independently to accept or reject cooperation. The agreement
of cooperation is reached if and only if all participants accept it. When the agreement of
cooperation is reached, all participants choose cooperative actions with group costs allocated
to them. The group costs (including participation cost εi) per capita is given by a real-valued
1When s = 1, the single participant has no incentive to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma.
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function c(s) where s is the number of all participants. All non-participants are free to defect.
When the agreement is not reached, all n individuals, both participants and non-participants,
play the original prisoner’s dilemma game.
The purpose of a group is to attain cooperation among its members. Since each member
has an incentive to defect in the prisoner’s dilemma, the group needs some suitable mechanism
to enforce cooperation. The mechanism has various functions such as monitoring members’
actions and punishing them for defection. Obviously, it is costly for group members to establish
such an enforcement mechanism. In what follows, to keep our game model of group formation
as simple as possible, we do not present a formal model of an enforcement mechanism in a
group, but we represent it simply by a group cost function c(s). Okada (1993) considered a
related model of group formation in which group members negotiate for creating an enforcement
institution.
Example 2.1. (Voluntary provision of a public good) There are n players i each with two
actions, contributing a fixed amount m of money to producing a public good (si = 1), or not
contributing (si = 0). Players decide their contributions independently. For an action profile
s = (s1, ..., sn), every player i receives ui(m
∑n
i=1 si)+m(1−si). We assume that (1) the payoff
function ui(s) of the total contribution s = m
∑n
i=1 si is differentiable on the interval [0,mn],
(2) 0 < u′i(s) < 1 for all s, and (3) ui(mn) > ui(0) +m. Under these assumptions, it is easy to
see that the game of voluntary contribution becomes an n-person prisoner’s dilemma game.
We now consider a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game of group formation
by the usual backward induction. First, we analyze the group negotiation stage. When a group
of s members agree to cooperate, every member receives
vi(C, s− 1) = ui(C, s− 1)− c(s).
We call vi(C, s−1) the group payoff of player i where s is the number of members in the group.
Concerning the group payoff, we assume the following property.
Assumption 2.2. For every i ∈ N , the group payoff vi(C, s− 1) of player i is monotonically
increasing in s, and there exists a unique positive integer si (2 ≤ si ≤ n) such that
vi(C, si − 2) < ui(D, 0) < vi(C, si − 1). (2.1)
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This assumption means that the property (Assumption 2.1) of the n-person prisoner’s
dilemma still holds true even if we replace the original cooperative payoff ui(C, h) with the
group payoff vi(C, h). If Assumption 2.2 does not hold, the problem of group formation becomes
rather trivial. For example, if vi(C, s−1) ≤ ui(D, 0) for all s ≤ n, then no players have incentive
to participate in a group. The positive integer si in (2.1) shows the minimum size of a group
in which member i can be better off than at the noncooperative equilibrium of the prisoner’s
dilemma. We call si player i’s threshold of cooperation. Player i can benefit by cooperation
when other (si − 1) players also cooperate. In this sense, players with smaller thresholds have
higher motivation to cooperate.
Definition 2.1. A subset S of N is called a successful group if |S| ≥ si for every i ∈ S.
The size of a successful group is greater than or equal to all members’ thresholds of coop-
eration. By definition, every member of a successful group can receive higher payoff than the
noncooperative payoff in the prisoner’s dilemma. The naming of a successful group is explained
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. In the group negotiation stage, an agreement for cooperation is reached by
the members of a group in a Nash equilibrium if and only if the group is successful.
Proof. Suppose that all s participants agree to cooperate. Then, every participant receives the
group payoff vi(C, s−1). If any one member reject to cooperate, negotiations break down by the
unanimity rule, and she receives the noncooperative payoff ui(D, 0) in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Therefore, the agreement of cooperation in a group S is reached in a Nash equilibrium if and
only if for all i ∈ S, vi(C, |S| − 1) ≥ ui(D, 0). From Assumption 2.2, this is equivalent to that
the group is successful.
The proposition implies that in every successful group the agreement of cooperation is
reached in a Nash equilibrium of the group negotiation stage. There exists, however, many
“trivial” Nash equilibria leading to the disagreement. For example, any action profile where
at least two participants reject to cooperate are such Nash equilibria. These trivial equilibria
are peculiar to the unanimity rule where everyone has a veto power. We remark that from the
viewpoint of every participant the action of agreement (weakly) dominates that of disagreement.
By this reason, we consider only the Nash equilibrium leading to the agreement of cooperation
in a successful group.
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Given the Nash equilibrium of the group negotiation stage, the participation decision stage
can be reduced to the following game. In the game, every player i in N choose simultaneously
and independently either σi = 1 (participation) or σi = 0 (non-participation). Let Σi = {0, 1}
be the set of actions of player i, and let Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi be the set of action profiles of n players.
For an action profile σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) ∈ Σ, the set S(σ) of participants is given by
S(σ) = {i ∈ N |σi = 1}.
The payoff fi(σ) of player i for an action profile σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) ∈ Σ is defined as follows.
(i) When a group S(σ) of participants is successful,
fi(σ) =
vi(C, |S(σ)| − 1) if σi = 1,ui(D, |S(σ)|) if σi = 0.
(ii) When S(σ) is not successful,
fi(σ) =
ui(D, 0)− εi if σi = 1,ui(D, 0) if σi = 0.
where εi (> 0) is a participation cost for a group.
Formally, the reduced form of the participation decision stage is represented by an n-person
game Γ = (N, {Σi, fi}i∈N ) in strategic form. We call it the group formation game.
The group formation game Γ differs from the n-person prisoner’s dilemma game in the
following aspects. In the game Γ, every participant does not need to cooperate (he never coop-
erates in equilibrium) if the number of participants is not large enough to satisfy her threshold
of cooperation. Neglecting a small participation cost εi, every participant can guarantee the
noncooperative payoff in the prisoner’s dilemma. This is not the case in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. If a player selects a cooperative action, she is free ridden by other defectors, and he may
be worse off than the noncooperative equilibrium. In the group formation game, the action of
non-participation does not dominate that of participation. A player can receive higher payoff
by participation than by non-participation when participation is critical to the formation of a
successful group.
Finally, we construct the group formation game Γ of the voluntary provision of a public
good in Example 2.1. The game generalizes Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1984) model of discrete
public good.
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Example 2.2. (The group formation game in Example 2.1) When s players participate in a
group in Example 2.1, the group payoff of player i is given by ui(sm) − c(s) where c(s) is
the group cost per member. Player i’s threshold si of cooperation is given by the minimum
integer s satisfying ui(sm) − c(s) > ui(0) + m. Every player i in N decide independently to
participate in a group of contributors (σi = 1), or not to participate (σi = 0). For an action
profile σ = (σ1, · · · , σn), every player i’s payoff fi(σ) is defined as follows.
(i) When the group of all participants is successful,
fi(σ) =
ui(sm)− c(s) if σi = 1,ui(sm) +m if σi = 0.
(ii) Otherwise,
fi(σ) =
ui(0) +m− ε if σi = 1,ui(0) +m if σi = 0.
Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1984) model of discrete public good is a special case of the group
formation game defined above. The provision level of the public good is binary, and the public
good is produced only if the number of contributors satisfy a critical level. All players have
identical (linear) payoff functions for the public good, and thus their thresholds of cooperation
are identical. The group cost c(s) is equal to the participation cost ε for any number of
participants.
3 The Nash Equilibria in the Group Formation Game
In this section, we characterize the set of Nash equilibria in the group formation game Γ. We
first examine the best response structure of the game Γ. For an action profile σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) ∈
Σ, let σ−i be the action profile obtained from σ by deleting σi. As usual, an action profile
σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) is sometimes denoted by σ = (σ−i, σi). Let S(σ) be the set of participants in
σ.
Definition 3.1. For an action profile σ = (σ−i, σi) ∈ Σ in Γ, player i’s action σi is called a




Definition 3.2. The best response graph V of Γ is a binary relation on the set of action profiles
Σ such that, for every σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, (σ, σ′) ∈ V if and only if σ 6= σ′ and there exists exactly one
player i satisfying (i) σ−i = σ′−i and (ii) σ
′
i is a best response to σ for i. When (σ, σ
′) ∈ V , we
write σ → σ′ and call it an edge from σ to σ′.
The definition of the best response graph is due to Young (1993). It plays an important
role in the analysis of stochastic stability of the Nash equilibrium as well as its existence.
Definition 3.3. For a successful group S, member i of S is called critical to S if S − {i} is
not successful.
No successful group can be sustained if any critical member opts out of it. The following
proposition characterizes the best response graph of the group formation game Γ.
Proposition 3.1. An edge of the best response graph V of the group formation game Γ must
be one of the following types.
(1) When S(σ) is a successful group, σ = (σ−i, 1) → (σ−i, 0) for all members i who are
not critical to S(σ).
(2) When S(σ) is not a successful group, σ = (σ−i, 1)→ (σ−i, 0) for all members i of S,
and σ = (σ−i, 0)→ (σ−i, 1) for all non-members i such that S(σ)∪{i} is a successful
group.
Proof. (1) Suppose that S(σ) is a successful group and that member i is not critical. Since the
group S(σ)− {i} remains successful, we have
fi(σ−i, 1) = vi(C, |S(σ)| − 1) < ui(D, |S(σ)| − 1) = fi(σ−i, 0).
Therefore, σi = 0 is a best response to σ for all non-critical members i of S(σ).
(2) Suppose that S(σ) is not a successful group. Then, for all i ∈ S,
fi(σ−i, 1) = ui(D, 0)− εi < ui(D, 0) ≤ fi(σ−i, 0),
where fi(σ−i, 0) is equal to either ui(D, |S(σ)| − 1) or ui(D, 0), depending on whether the
remaining group except player i is successful or not. For any non-member i such that S(σ)∪{i}
is a successful group,
fi(σ−i, 0) = ui(D, 0) < vi(C, |S(σ)|) = fi(σ−i, 1).
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Finally, it can be easily seen that there exist no other edges in the best response graph V given
in the theorem.
Proposition 3.1 reveals the best response structure of the group formation game. In a
successful group, every non-critical member has an incentive to deviate from the group because,
by doing so, she can free ride on cooperation by the group. In an unsuccessful group, every
member has an incentive to deviate from the group for saving participation costs. Remark that
a player outside an unsuccessful group has an incentive to join the group if her participation
makes the group successful. By Proposition 3.1, we can characterize strict Nash equilibria in
Γ.
Proposition 3.2. The group formation game Γ has the following strict Nash equilibria σ =
(σ1, · · · , σn).
(1) σ = (0, · · · , 0), i.e., S(σ) = ∅.
(2) S(σ) is a successful group with every member critical to S(σ).
The proposition can be explained intuitively by an alternative definition of a Nash equilib-
rium of the group formation game Γ. A group of participants in the Nash equilibrium satisfy
two stability properties:
Internal stability : No single member want to opt out of the group.
External stability : No single outsider want to join the group.
It is clear that the action profile σ = (0, · · · , 0) is a Nash equilibrium because no one is willing to
cooperate unilaterally. When a group is not successful, the internal stability is violated because
all participants want to opt out of the group for saving participation costs. When a group is
successful, the external stability always holds because all non-participants have incentive to free
ride. The internal stability implies that every participant is critical to the group. We remark
that if there exists no participation costs, the action profile σ = (0, · · · , 0) is a non-strict Nash
equilibrium because every player is indifferent to her decision of participation. In this case,
action profiles leading to unsuccessful groups are non-strict Nash equilibria if no outsider’s
participation makes the group successful.
We next characterize a Nash equilibrium of the group formation game Γ in terms of players’
thresholds of cooperation. For S ⊂ N and m = 2, · · · , n, we define FS(m) by the number
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of all members in S whose thresholds of cooperation are given by m. That is, FS(m) =
| { i ∈ S | si = m } |. FS represents the distribution of members of S in terms of thresholds of
cooperation. Its definition implies the next lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For S ⊂ N ,
(1) FS(2) + · · ·+ FS(|S|) ≤ |S|.
(2) A group S is successful if and only if FS(2) + · · ·+ FS(|S|) = |S|.
Proposition 3.3. A nonempty subset S of N is the set of participants in a Nash equilibrium
of the group formation game Γ if and only if
FS(2) + · · ·+ FS(|S|) = |S| and FS(|S|) ≥ 2.
Proof. From Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.1, it is sufficient to prove that every member of a
successful group S is critical to S if and only if FS(|S|) ≥ 2. Suppose that FS(|S|) ≥ 2. For
every i ∈ S, group S − {i} is not successful because FS−{i}(|S|) ≥ 1. Thus, every member i
of S is critical to S. If FS(|S|) = 1, then a unique member i with si = |S| is not critical to S
because S − {i} is a successful group. If FS(|S|) = 0, all members j of S have thresholds sj of
cooperation with sj ≤ |S| − 1. Therefore, they are not critical to S.
¿From the proposition, we can see how the heterogeneity of a society affects the group
formation. When a society is homogeneous in the sense that all players have identical thresholds
s (2 ≤ s ≤ n) of cooperation, the size of an equilibrium group is uniquely determined by the
common threshold s. On the other hand, when a society is heterogeneous, there exist generally
many Nash equilibria in the group formation game Γ. For example, if there exist at least two
players who have thresholds s of cooperation for each integer s = 2, · · · ,m, then a successful
group of every size s can be formed in a Nash equilibrium of Γ. The heterogeneity of a society
causes the multiplicity of the Nash equilibrium in the group formation game.
The heterogeneity of a society also affects the efficiency (the number of cooperators) of
a group as follows. In a homogeneous society, the largest group of n players can be formed
under a stringent condition that all players’ thresholds are equal to the number n of players,
s1 = · · · = sn = n. To put it differently, the full cooperation can be attained in a homogeneous
society only if all players are “reluctant” to cooperate. In a heterogeneous society, the largest
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group may be sustained in equilibrium under a much weaker condition that FN (n) ≥ 2, that
is, there are at least two players whose thresholds are n.
4 Stochastically Stability in Games
The analysis thus far shows that there are multiple equilibria in a group formation game. More
specifically, there are three types of equilibria. First, the “global defection,” in which no one
cooperates, is always a strict equilibrium. Second, in games with heterogeneous thresholds,
there are typically “partial cooperation” equilibria, in which some players cooperate but the
others do not. Third, the “full cooperation,” in which everyone cooperates, is also a strict
equilibrium. Thus the question arises as to which type of equilibrium is most likely to prevail.
To tackle this problem, we adopt the stochastic equilibrium selection theory a´ la Young
(1993). In this section, we briefly review the selection theory, and show that it is directly
applicable to group formation games.
Let G be an n-person strategic form game, with the set of strategies Ai, i = 1, . . . , n. Given
a positive integer m, let H be the m-fold direct product of A = A1 × · · · × An. We call an
h ∈ H a state. A state h is a sequence of strategy profiles with length m. H is the state space
of Young’s (1993) Markov chain.
Roughly speaking, the selection theory of Young (1993) works as follows. At each period,
each player is given a set consists of k-strategy profiles (k < m). Let us call the set a sample.
Profiles in the sample are randomly drawn (without replacement) from the current state h,
which consists of m-most recently occurred profiles. In determining her strategy for that period,
each player chooses a best response to her sample. There is a probability  ≥ 0, however, that
the player enters into an “experimentation” mode. In the experimentation mode, instead of
playing a best response, she chooses her strategy randomly. This behavioral specification is
called adaptive play (with or without mistakes according to  > 0 or  = 0). We make following
assumptions. For each player i and each state h, every possible sample of size kfrom h has
a positive probability to be drawn for i. In the adaptive play with mistakes ( > 0), given
that i is in the experimentation mode, each possible strategy of i can be chosen with positive
probability. Sample drawings, occurrence of experimentation modes, and random choices in
them are all independent both across players and across periods. These assumptions make
the adaptive play with mistakes an irreducible and aperiodic finite state Markov chain on H.
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Thus, for each  > 0, there is a unique stationary distribution µ on H. A state h ∈ H is
stochastically stable (Foster and Young 1990) if lim→0 µ(h) > 0.
Recall the best response graph V of G (Definition 3.2). A finite sequence a1, . . . , aL in A is
a best response path if (al, al+1) ∈ V for every l = 1, . . . , L−1. The game G is said to be weakly
acyclic if, for every action profile a ∈ A, either a is a strict Nash equilibrium or there exists
a best response path a = a1, a2, . . . , aL such that aL is a strict Nash equilibrium. For weakly
acyclic games, the notion of stochastic stability leads to equilibrium selection as follows. A
recurrent class of a finite state Markov chain is a nonempty set of states that is minimal with
respect to the property that once the chain moves into the set, it stays within the set thereafter.
Consider recurrent classes of the adaptive play without mistakes ( = 0). In general, a recurrent
class contains multiple states. However, if the stage game is weakly acyclic, then there is a
one to one correspondence between strict equilibria of G and recurrent classes of the adaptive
play without mistakes. Specifically, let NE = {e1, . . . , eJ} be the set of strict Nash equilibria
in the weakly acyclic game G. Young (1993) shows that if sampling is sufficiently incomplete,2
then recurrent classes are precisely H1, . . . , HJ , where Hj = {hj} = {(ej , . . . , ej)}. Moreover,
Young (1993) shows that a stochastically stable state must belong to a recurrent class of the
adaptive play without mistakes. Thus, for a weakly acyclic game G, a stochastically stable
state is essentially a strict equilibrium of G. Let us say that a strict equilibrium of a weakly
acyclic game is stochastically stable if the corresponding state is stochastically stable. If the
stochastically stable equilibrium is unique, it is the one that is observed infinitely many more
times than other equilibria in the long run, when the probability of mistakes is infinitely small.
In this sense, the notion of stochastic stability gives rise to selection among strict equilibria.
What follows is the formal procedure to identify stochastically stable equilibria of a weakly
acyclic game G. Let h = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ H and h′ = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ H be two states. A state
h′ is a successor of h if bl = al+1 for l = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Let h′ be a successor of h. Note that
any sample of size k from h given to player i, namely, a k-length subsequence of (a1, . . . , am),
determines a probability distribution on A−i, as its empirical frequency. Denote bm = (bmi , b
m
−i).
The strategy bmi ∈ Ai chosen by i is a mistake in the transition from h to h′ if h has no sample
of size k such that bmi is a best response to the empirical frequency of that sample. For every
2Let LG is the maximum length of all such best response sequences. The sampling is sufficiently incomplete
if k ≤ m/(LG + 2).
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h, h′ ∈ H, define resistance r(h, h′) of the transition from h to h′ as follows.
r(h, h′) =

the total number of mistakes
in the transition from h to h′, if h′ is a successor of h,
∞, otherwise.
A sequence of states ω = (h1, . . . , hL) with hl ∈ H (1 ≤ l ≤ L) is called a path from h1




l, hl+1). In words, r(ω) is the total number of mistakes that the path ω
contains. Note that a path (h1, . . . , hL) can be considered to be a sequence of action profiles,
as opposed to a sequence of states. That is, the m action profiles that consist of h1, followed
by the “rightmost” profiles of the successive states h2, . . . , hL. In other words, any sequence of
action profiles with length exceeding m determines a path.
For each e ∈ NE, let h(e) be the corresponding state: h(e) = (e, . . . , e). In stochastic sta-
bility analysis, the notion of resistance between equilibrium states is crucial. For two different
equilibria e, e′ ∈ NE, define resistance from e to e′ by
r(e, e′) = min
{
r(ω) | ω is a path from h(e) to h(e′)} .
In words, r(e, e′) is the minimum number of mistakes that is sufficient for allowing a path from
e to e′.
A binary relation T on NE is an e-tree if (i) (e, e′) /∈ T for every e′ ∈ NE; (ii) for every
e′ 6= e, there are eι1 , . . . , eιL ∈ NE with eι1 = e′ and eιL = e such that (eιl , eιl+1) ∈ T for every





Young (1993) shows that a strict Nash equilibrium e of G is stochastically stable if and only if
for every e′-tree T ′ there is an e-tree T such that ρ(T ) ≤ ρ(T ′).
It remains to show that the selection theory of Young (1993) is directly applicable to the
group formation game. A best response path a1, . . . , aL is called a cycle if a1 = aL. The stage
game G is said to be acyclic if no best response path is a cycle. Since the stage game G is
finite, if G is acyclic, then it is weakly acyclic.
Proposition 4.1. The group formation game Γ is acyclic.
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Proof. Let σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) be any action profile in Γ, and let S(σ) be the set of participants
at σ. The following two cases are possible.
Case 1. S(σ) is a successful group:
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that any possible edge σ → σ′ from σ must have the form of
σ′ = (σ−i, 0) for some i ∈ S such that S(σ) is successful. This means that any best response
path starting at σ never return to σ, and thus that there is no cycle including σ.
Case 2. S(σ) is not a successful group:
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that any possible edge σ → σ′ from σ must be one of the
following two types: (i) σ′ = (σ−i, 0) for some i ∈ S, and (ii) σ′ = (σ−i, 1) for some i /∈ S such
that S ∪ {i} is a successful group. It can be seen from the proof in case 1 that, once subcase
(ii) happens, all vertices σ′′ in a best response path following σ′ are associated with successful
groups S(σ′′). This implies that there is no cycle including σ in subcase (ii). Now assume that
subcase (i) holds. Consider an edge σ → σ′ = (σ−i, 0) for i ∈ S. If S(σ′) is a successful group,
the same arguments as in subcase (ii) can be applied. Therefore, it suffices us to consider only a
best response path σ = σ0, σ1, σ2. · · · , σm such that for all k = 1, · · · ,m, S(σk) = S(σk−1)−{j}
for some j ∈ S(σk−1) and S(σk) is not a successful group. Clearly, such a best response path
never returns to σ. Thus, there exists no cycle including σ in subcase (i), either.
5 Equilibrium Selection in Group Formation Games
In the group formation game with heterogeneous thresholds, there are three types of equilibria:
the global defection, the partial cooperation, and the full cooperation. Which equilibrium is
most likely to prevail? Since the group formation game is acyclic, we can identify, in principle,
which equilibrium is the most stable in the sense of stochastic stability. In practice, however, it
turns out to be quite complex to evaluate the relevant resistances for general group formation
games. Thus we turn to a specific class of them, which consists of the group formation games
with two types of players.
5.1 The Group Formation Game with Two Types of Players
A group formation game with two types of players is defined as follows. Recall that the
set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}. Let us partition N into two sets, N1 = {1, . . . , n1} and
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N2 = {n1 + 1, . . . , n}. The size of N1 and N2 are n1 and n2 = n−n1, respectively. We assume
that n1, n2 ≥ 2. N1 and N2 represent two types of players as follows. Assume that
si = n1 for every i ∈ N1, and si = n = n1 + n2 for every i ∈ N2,
where si is player i’s threshold of cooperation, defined in Section 2. For a player in N1, it
may be optimal to cooperate when just n1 − 1 others do. In contrast, a player in N2 has
lower motivation to cooperate, in that only when all the other n1 + n2 − 1 players cooperate,
it becomes advantageous to herself to follow suit.
The assumption of two types drastically simplify the analysis in many ways but it still
possesses essential characters of the group formation game. Most important, it follows from
Proposition 3.3 that there are exactly three strict Nash equilibria.
Proposition 5.1. In a group formation game with two types, there are exactly three strict
Nash equilibria. They are
e1 = (0, . . . , 0), e2 = (
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
n2︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0 ), and e3 = (1, . . . , 1).
In words, e1 is the global defection, e2 is the partial cooperation, and e3 is the full co-
operation. Concerning the best response structure of this game, notice the crucial difference
between the two types. For a player in N1, there are no situations in which she receives more by
defecting than the global defection payoff. In other words, no member in N1 has an incentive
to free ride. In contrast, when all members in N1 cooperate, a player in N2 possibly earns more
by defecting than the global defection payoff. That is, she has an incentive to free ride. In this
sense, members of N2 are potential free riders. As a result, their best response structure is
more intricate than that of players in N1. For this reason, it is behavior and payoff of potential
free riders that become most critical to subsequent analysis. Note that members in N2 are in
fact free riding in the partial cooperation equilibrium.
It proves useful to parameterize players’ payoffs. For every i ∈ N1, define
ai = vi(C, n1 − 1), ci = ui(D, 0)− εi, di = ui(D, 0).
ai is the equilibrium payoff in e2, the partial cooperation. A unilateral deviation by an i ∈ N1
from e2 results in di, which is equal to the equilibrium payoff in e1, the global defection. A
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unilateral deviation by an i ∈ N1 from e1 results in ci. Note that ai > di > ci. For every
i ∈ N2, let
ai = vi(C, n− 1), ci = ui(D, 0)− εi, di = ui(D, 0), fi = ui(D,n1).
For player i ∈ N2, ai is the equilibrium payoff in e3, the full cooperation. A unilateral deviation
by an i ∈ N2 from e3 results in di, which is equal to the equilibrium payoff in e1. A unilateral
deviation by an i ∈ N2 from e1 results in ci. fi is the free riding payoff. Note that fi > di > ci
and ai > di.
5.2 Evaluating Resistances
In order to identify the stochastically stable equilibrium, we invoke the “tree analysis” described
in Section 4. To do so, we need to evaluate the resistances. Recall that the resistance r(e, e′) is
a positive integer such that any path from an equilibrium e to another equilibrium e′ contains
at least r(e, e′) mistakes, and that there is such a path with exactly r(e, e′) mistakes. There are
two ways to evaluate the resistance. First, to evaluate it from above, it suffices to construct
a path from e to e′. r(e, e′) never exceeds the number of mistakes that the constructed path
contains. Second, to evaluate it from below, it proves useful to consider an exiting path from
the originating equilibrium and its first exitors.
Definition 5.1. Given an equilibrium state h(e) = (e, . . . , e), an exiting path from e is a path3
of action profiles from h(e) to another state h that contains a profile σ in which some player
i ∈ N plays a best response σi different from ei. For an existing path (e, · · · , e, σ1, · · · , σT )
from e, a player i∗ ∈ N is called a first exitor if i∗ plays a best response that differs from the
equilibrium e for the first time during the path.
For example, a path from h(e2) is an exiting path if it contains σ such that σi = 1 for
some i ∈ N2 and this choice is a best response. Thus in this case, the path contains a sample
to which i ∈ N2 optimally chooses 1. If i∗ ∈ N who chooses στ∗i∗ at date τ∗ is a first exitor of
an exiting path from h(e), then for every i ∈ N (including i∗) and every date 1 ≤ τ < τ∗ any
action στi is a mistake whenever σ
τ
i 6= ei. Note that a first exitor need not be unique. Any
path from h(ei) to h(ej) is an exiting path from ei, but not vice versa.
3Taken as a sequence of action profiles, as opposed to a sequence of states.
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In a group formation game with two types, the best response structure of a member of N1
differs from that of a member of N2. For example, the action 1 (participation) is a best response
for i ∈ N2 only to e3−i, but j ∈ N1 can optimally choose 1 to e2−j as well as to e3−j . Thus we
need to distinguish exiting paths accordingly. Recall that r(ω) is the number of mistakes that
a path ω contains. For each equilibrium e, define
ri(e,N1) = min { r(ω) | ω is an exiting path from e, with i ∈ N1 as its first exitor } ,










which we call the exit resistance of e. It is clear that r(e, e′) ≥ r(e) for any e′ 6= e. Moreover,
if there is a path from e to e′ with exactly r(e) number of mistakes, then r(e, e′) = r(e).
Let us start with the global defection equilibrium, e1, in which every player chooses 0.
Consider an exiting path from e1 with a player i ∈ N1 as its first exitor. Any such path (a
sequence of action profiles with length more than m) from e1 contains a sample (a k-length
subsequence of the path) to which i can optimally choose 1. Recall that i ∈ N1 optimally
plays action 1 either to the action profile e2−i or to e
3
−i. To any other action profile, 0 is the
unique best response. Thus any such sample must contain a sufficient number of e2−i or e
3
−i.
Since we are interested in the minimum number of mistakes, fix a sample that contains e2−i,
but not e3−i. Now, how many e
2
−i is needed? If i chooses 1, she earns the partial cooperation
payoff ai against e2−i. Against other profiles, she receives the noncooperative payoff di, minus
the participation cost εi. On the other hand, she can assure di if she chooses 0. Now it is
clear that if the cost is sufficiently small, then just one e2−i suffices. In fact, in our model εi
represents only the participation cost for negotiation, as opposed to the maintenance cost for
cooperation. Thus it is natural to assume that it is indeed “small.” This leads us to conclude
that ri(e1, N1) = n1 − 1. A similar argument shows that ri(e1, N2) = n − 1. Thus we have
r(e1) = n1 − 1.
For the partial cooperation equilibrium e2, we need more careful treatment. It is useful
to introduce some terminology. Given an action profile σ and a player i ∈ N , σ−i is called a
subprofile. Any subprofile σ−i such that σ−i /∈ {e2−i, e3−i} is called a disequilibrium subprofile.4
Note that just one mistake is enough to turn e2−i or e
3
−i into a disequilibrium subprofile.
4In particular, e1−i is a disequilibrium subprofile.
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Consider ri(e2, N2) first. In e2, every i ∈ N2 free rides by choosing 0. To evaluate ri(e2, N2),
we look for the minimum number of mistakes that is enough to rationalize i ∈ N2 to switch
to 1. Fix a player i ∈ N2 and assume that i is a first exitor in an exiting path from e2. For
i ∈ N2, e3−i is the only subprofile to which she optimally plays action 1. The best response to
e2−i is 0, and by so choosing, she earns the free riding payoff, fi. The unique best response to
a disequilibrium subprofile is also 0, which results in the global defection payoff, di. Against
what kind of sample does player i ∈ N2 optimally choose 1? There are two kinds of samples
to be distinguished. First, consider a sample that arises as follows. On day 1 (say), all players
j ∈ N2 (j 6= i) happen to make mistakes simultaneously. And from date 2 on, up to the point
where a sufficient number of e3−is accumulate, the simultaneous mistakes occur consecutively.
This yields a sample that consists of e2−i and e
3
−i. The incentive to free ride is present, and it
is directly countered by the sufficient number of e3−i. Player i’s best response to the sample is
1 if
sai + (k − s)ci ≥ sdi + (k − s)fi,
where s (k − s, resp.) is the number of e3−i (e2−i, resp.) in the sample. Therefore the sufficient




ai − di + fi − ci
)
.
For this type of exit to happen, at least (n2 − 1)αik mistakes are required. An exit of this
kind is called an exit via direct transition. Figure 1 exhibits a path in which an exit via direct
transition occurs. In this and similar figures that follow, an action by mistake is indicated by
an asterisk, as 1∗.
(Figure 1 appears about here.)
There is another type of exit from e2. Consider a sample which consists of k − 1 dise-
quilibrium subprofiles, together with just one e3−i. For example, this sample arises as follows.
Since originating equilibrium is e2, on date 0 i ∈ N2 has the sample that entirely consists of
e2−i. From day 1 to day k, at least one player j 6= i makes a mistake, and on just one of these
dates all players j ∈ N2 (j 6= i) happen to make mistakes simultaneously. On date k + 1, the
incentive to free ride disappears. As a result and similarly to the argument applied to r(e1),
the best response to the sample is 1 if the participation cost is small enough. For such an event
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to happen, the total number of mistakes required is k − 1 + (n2 − 1). Let us call this kind of
exit an exit via indirect transition. Such an exit is depicted in Figure 2.
(Figure 2 appears about here.)
Now it is clear that n2, the number of potential free riders, matters. If n2 = 2, the required
number of mistakes in an exit via direct transition never exceeds that in an exit via indirect
transition. Thus ri(e2, N2) is given by the number of mistakes in the direct transition. For
three or more players, however, it may well be the case that indirect transition arises with
smaller number of mistakes. Intuitively, ri(e2, N2) is given by the direct transition if n2 is
“small,” but when it is “large” it is given by the indirect transition. Note that the indirect
transition with three or more players requires more than k mistakes (k − 1 + (n2 − 1) > k). It
is worth emphasizing that the large/small distinction becomes relevant because we allow three
or more players in N2. The distinction reflects a salient feature of games with more than two
players.
Consider ri(e2, N1) next. In e2, every i ∈ N1 takes 1. Thus we look for the minimum
number of mistakes required for an optimal switch by i to 0. For i ∈ N1, 0 is a best response
only to disequilibrium subprofiles. Since the originating state is h(e2), however, the initial
sample given to i entirely consists of e2−i. Thus each e
2
−i should be replaced by a disequilibrium
subprofile. Specifically, when the participation cost εi is small enough, the argument given
to ri(e1, N1) also applies here. Namely, all of the e2−is need to be replaced by disequilibrium
subprofiles. This can happen, for example, on each day from date 1 to date k at least one player
j 6= i makes a mistake. On date k + 1, a sample that contains only disequilibrium subprofiles
is available for i, which allows her to switch optimally to 0. Thus ri(e2, N1) = k. We also call
this type of exit an exit via indirect transition. To summarize, we have r(e2) = ri(e2, N1) = k
when n2 is large and r(e2) ≤ ri(e2, N2) < k when n2 is small.
For exits from the full cooperation equilibrium e3, we also need a large/small distinction
of n2. There is an important difference to note, however. ri(e3, N2) never exceeds k even if
n2 is “large,” since 0 is a best response to the sample that consists entirely of disequilibrium
subprofiles.
These observations lead to the following definition.
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Definition 5.2. The incentive ratio of player i ∈ N2 is the fraction
ηi =
ai − di
fi − di .
The population size n2 of N2 is large (small , resp.) to exit from e2 for player i ∈ N2 if
n2 − 2 ≥ ηi (n2 − 2 < ηi, resp.) .
n2 is large to exit from e2 if it is large to exit from e2 for every i ∈ N2. Otherwise, n2 is small
to exit from e2.
Similarly, n2 is large (small , resp.) to exit from e3 for player i ∈ N2 if
n2 − 2 ≥ 1
ηi
(





n2 is large to exit from e3 if it is large to exit from e3 for every i ∈ N2. Otherwise, n2 is small
to exit from e3.
Compared to the global defection, every i ∈ N2 receives a larger payoff in both the partial
cooperation and the full cooperation. The incentive ratio ηi measures the relative magnitude
of the payoff advantages of the full cooperation equilibrium and the partial cooperation equi-





ai − di + fi − ci
)




ai − di + fi − ci
)
.
Denote by dze the minimum integer greater or equal to a real number z.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that εi is sufficiently small and k is sufficiently large.
(1) If n2 is large to exit from e2, then r(e2) = k.
(2) If n2 is small to exit from e2, then r(e2) = mini∈N2 ri(e2, N2) and
(n2 − 1)αk ≤ r(e2) ≤ (n2 − 1) dαke < k.
(3) If n2 is large to exit from e3, then r(e3) = k.
(4) If n2 is small to exit from e3, then r(e3) = mini∈N2 ri(e3, N2) and
(n2 − 1)βk ≤ r(e3) ≤ (n2 − 1) dβke < k.
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The lemma confirms that the large/small distinction works as desired. In Lemma 5.1, αk
approximates the required number of repetitions of e2−i in an exit via direct transition, and βk
does so for e3−i. Lemma 5.1 is proved in Appendix. We proceed to evaluate resistances.
Lemma 5.2.
(1) r(e1, e2) ≤ n1 and r(e1, e2) < r(e1, e3).
(2) r(e2, e1) = r(e2).
(3) r(e3, e1) = r(e3).
(4) If n2 is large to exit from e2, then r(e2, e3) > k.
The exit resistance r(e) gives a lower bound for the resistance r(e, e′). By constructing a
path from e to e′, on the other hand, we get an upper bound for it. Consider the global defection
equilibrium e1. Starting from state h(e1), suppose that players i = 1, . . . , n1 simultaneously
choose action 1 by mistake on, say, date 1. As we saw earlier, just one e2−i is enough for
i ∈ N1 to switch optimally to 1, provided the participation cost is sufficiently small. Therefore
every i ∈ N1 can play action 1 optimally from date 2 on. See Figure 3. Thus r(e1, e2) ≤ n1.
Moreover, one can show that r(e1, e3) > r(e1, e2). Thus we have Lemma 5.2.(1).
(Figure 3 appears about here.)
By definition, if there is a path from e to e′ with exactly r(e) number of mistakes, then
r(e, e′) = r(e). Consider the partial cooperation equilibrium e2, and recall the path that
implements an exit by i ∈ N2 via direct transition (Figure 1). In the path, all players in N1
keep best responding. It is players j ∈ N2 (j 6= i) that makes mistakes. While they are making
mistakes, i keeps playing 0 optimally. Therefore, no e3−j appears in the path. Thus there is
no chance for j to switch to 1. Consequently, after i optimally switches to 1, her consecutive
choices of 1 give rise to an accumulation of disequilibrium subprofiles for j 6= i. This directs, in
particular, players in N1 to switch to 0. In this way, the optimal switch to 1 by i ∈ N2 does not
lead to e3, but to e1. Therefore r(e2, e1) = r(e2). Similar arguments apply, not only for indirect
transitions out of e2, but also for transitions out of the full cooperation equilibrium e3. Thus we
have Lemma 5.2.(2) and (3). As a result, we have r(e2, e1) ≤ r(e2, e3) and r(e3, e1) ≤ r(e3, e2).
This result suggests that when the adaptive play moves from the partial cooperation to the
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full cooperation, or the other way around, it is easier to follow the indirect path, in which the
play moves first to the global defection equilibrium, and then to the destination equilibrium.
In the next section, this intuition turns out to be correct.
Lemma 5.2.(4) is a consequence of the fact that ri(e2, N2) exceeds k when n2 is large to
exit from e2. Lemma 5.2 is proved in Appendix.
The analysis so far results in two types of evaluations of resistances. First, the resistances
out of e2 or e3 are evaluated in terms of k. Specifically, they are at most k, and some of them
are less than k only if n2 is small. Second, the resistances out of e1 are independent of k, and
are evaluated in terms of n1. Having made no assumption concerning the relative magnitude
of k and n1, there is no way to compare the two types of resistances. We focus our analysis on
the situation in which the sample size k is much larger than the group size n1. In other words,
we restrict attention to games with “medium” number of players.
Lemma 5.3. For sufficiently large k, r(e1, e2) < min{r(e2, e1), r(e3, e1)}.




n1(ai − di + fi − ci)
fi − ci ,




then we have n1 < min{r(e2), r(e3)} by Lemma 5.1. By definition of the exit resistance,
r(eι) ≤ r(eι, e1), where ι = 2, 3. Therefore n1 < min{r(e2, e1), r(e3, e1)}.
We are now ready to derive equilibrium selection results.
5.3 Equilibrium Selection
Let us say that a tree (weakly, resp.) dominates another if the stochastic potential of the former
is strictly less than (less than or equal to, resp.) that of the latter. In the group formation
game, there are nine trees to consider. They are shown in Figure 4. In what follows, we assume
that the sample size k is sufficiently large and participation costs εi (i ∈ N2) are sufficiently
small.
(Figure 4 appears about here.)
Lemma 5.4. Minimum tree is either T4, T5, T7, or T8. Moreover, T5 weakly dominates T4.
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Proof. By Lemma 5.2.(1), T4 and T7 dominate T6 and T9, respectively. By Lemma 5.3, T4,
T5, and T7 dominate T1, T2, and T3, respectively. Finally, T5 weakly dominates T4 by Lemma
5.2.(3).
The first result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 5.1. The global defection equilibrium is not stochastically stable.
If the set N1 of players is “medium” sized, the resistance from the global defection to
the partial cooperation becomes the smallest among the all resistances. That is, the global
defection is the easiest one to flow out from. Therefore it is not stochastically stable. It follows
that the stochastically stable equilibrium must be either partial cooperation or full cooperation.
To identify the selection outcome, it turns out to be critical whether or not n2 is large to exit
from e2. In what follows, let us say n2 is large if n2 is large to exit from e2.
Theorem 5.2. If n2 is large, then the partial cooperation equilibrium is uniquely stochastically
stable.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4, it suffices to show that T5 dominates both T7 and T8. It follows from
Lemma 5.1.(3), (4), and Lemma 5.2.(3) that r(e3, e1) ≤ k. If n2 is large to exit from e2, then
r(e2, e3) > k by Lemma 5.2.(4). Thus r(e2, e3) > r(e3, e1). Therefore T5 dominates T7. If n2
is large to exit from e2, then r(e2, e1) ≥ k by Lemma 5.1.(1). Thus r(e2, e1) ≥ r(e3, e1). This
inequality and Lemma 5.2.(1) together imply that
r(e2, e1) + r(e1, e3) > r(e3, e1) + r(e1, e2).
Therefore T5 dominates T8.
In words, when the number of potential free riders exceeds a critical level, the partial
cooperation equilibrium is stable. There are two ways to read the assumption of the theorem
n2 − 2 ≥ max
i∈N2
ai − di
fi − di ,
which in turn suggest two interpretations of the theorem, respectively. First, given the incentive
ratios of the potential free riders, the theorem states that the free riding equilibrium is the
unique stable outcome when there are sufficient number of them. Second, given the number
of potential free riders, the stronger the incentive to free ride, the smaller the incentive ratio.
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The theorem tells us, quite naturally, when the incentive to free ride is sufficiently strong,
the free riding equilibrium is likely to be observed in the long run. Notice that if fi > ai for
every i ∈ N2, the theorem applies for every n2 ≥ 3. Since we allow heterogeneous preferences,
however, some players may well have large incentive ratios. In such a case, the assumption of
the theorem becomes harder to be satisfied.
Technically, the result comes roughly as follows. When n2 is large it follows that the
resistance from the partial cooperation e2 to the full cooperation e3 is greater than k, and
that the resistance from the partial cooperation e2 to the global defection e1 is exactly k. The
resistance from e3 to e1 is, on the other hand, less than or equal to k. By the first consequence,
the e3 tree e1 → e2 → e3 is dominated by the e2 tree e3 → e1 → e2. By the second, the other e3
tree e2 → e1 → e3 is dominated by the same e2 tree. Thus the minimum tree is e3 → e1 → e2.
When the number of potential free riders is smaller than the critical level, it turns out
that the stochastically stable outcome is determined by a variant of risk dominance relation
(Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Before stating the result, let us introduce the risk dominance
relation relevant here.
Assume that all players in N2 expects that the game will be played according to either the
full cooperation equilibrium or the partial cooperation equilibrium, but they are not certain
about which equilibrium will prevail. Suppose that each player i in N2 expects that the partial
cooperation equilibrium is played with probability t, and the full cooperation equilibrium with
probability 1 − t. If she participates in a group, she receives expected payoff tdi + (1 − t)ai
(neglecting small participation costs εi). If she does not participate, she receives expected
payoff tfi + (1− t)di. Then, it is optimal for her to stay at the full cooperation equilibrium if
t < ηi1+ηi . Thus, mini∈N2
ηi
1+ηi
can be interpreted as the maximum level of risk that all players




interpreted as the maximum level of risk that all players in N2 can take in staying at the partial










then the full cooperation equilibrium is more “robust” than the partial cooperation equilibrium
in the risk consideration. In this case, following the spirit of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), we
say that the full cooperation equilibrium risk dominates the partial cooperation equilibrium.
We are now ready to present the final result. The proof is given in Appendix.
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Theorem 5.3. Assume that n2 is small.




















The risk dominance relation can be rewritten in a simpler form. Let ηM (ηm, resp.) be
the highest (lowest, resp.) incentive ratio among all potential free riders in N2. Then, the risk







which can be reduced to ηmηM > 1, or
(am − dm)(aM − dM ) > (fm − dm)(fM − dM ).
The last inequality makes it clear that the risk dominance here is a variant of the original
version of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In particular, the two coincide each other when n2 = 2.
Moreover, when the full cooperation equilibrium is strictly Pareto efficient, that is, ai > fi
for every i ∈ N2, then the former risk dominates the latter, and thus the full cooperation
equilibrium is stochastically stable.
It is now instructive to consider the following game. In the group formation game, fix
the action of every player in N1 at the participation. The resulting game is a coordination
game played by potential free riders, in which there are exactly two strict equilibria, the
partial cooperation and the full cooperation. The intuition behind Theorem 5.3 is that, when
n2 is small, the stochastically stable outcome of the whole game is the same as that of the
restricted coordination game. Therefore the outcome is determined by the risk dominance
relation. Contrary to the original version of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), however, the relevant
risk dominance relation involves only the maximum incentive ratio and the minimum incentive
ratio. In stochastic stability analysis, only the minimum number of mistakes to upset a given




We have investigated the problem of group formation in collective action in a game theoretic
model. Our analysis has been focused on how heterogeneity of preferences affects the formation
and dynamic stability of voluntary groups. In the model, heterogeneous preferences are de-
scribed by the threshold of cooperation and the incentive ratio of cooperation and free-riding.
We have shown that the heterogeneous preferences yield a genuine multiplicity of strict Nash
equilibria, in that, in addition to the global defection equilibrium, there are in general many
types of cooperative equilibria. By applying the stochastic stability theory, we have consid-
ered which equilibrium is more likely to prevail. The equilibrium selection problem has been
analyzed in the group formation game with two types of individuals. We have shown that
when the number of individuals less motivated to cooperate is larger than a critical level, the
partial cooperation is uniquely stochastically stable. Otherwise, the stochastic stability selects
a risk dominant equilibrium. The risk dominance relation is determined by the highest and the
lowest incentive ratios among those of potential free riders. The full cooperation equilibrium
is uniquely stochastically stable if there exists at least one individual whose incentive ratio is
relatively high, or if there exists no individual whose incentive ratio is considerably low.
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ai − di + fi − ci and βi =
ai − di
ai − di + fi − ci .
Lemma A.1. Let i ∈ N2. For sufficiently small εi, ri(e,Nl) (l = 1, 2) is given as follows.
(1) ri(e1, N1) = n1 − 1.
(2) ri(e1, N2) = n− 1.
(3) ri(e2, N1) = k.
(4) If n2 is large to exit from e2 for player i, then ri(e2, N2) > k.
(5) If n2 is small to exit from e2 for player i, then for sufficiently large k,
(n2 − 1)αik ≤ ri(e2, N2) ≤ (n2 − 1) dαike < k.
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(6) ri(e3, N1) = k.
(7) If n2 is large to exit from e3 for player i, then ri(e3, N2) = k.
(8) If n2 is small to exit from e3 for player i, then for sufficiently large k,
(n2 − 1)βik ≤ ri(e3, N2) ≤ (n2 − 1) dβike < k.
Proof of Lemma A.1.
We are going to evaluate each ri(ej , Nl) by setting up the relevant integer program, and then
evaluating its optimal value. In such a program, t and s are nonnegative integer variables that
satisfy t+s ≤ k, where k is the sample size of the adaptive play. Note that for sufficiently small
εi, ⌈
kεi





ai − di + εi
⌉
= k.
Lemma A.1.(1). ri(e1, N1) = n1 − 1.
Proof. Recall that a player i ∈ N1 optimally plays action 1 either against the action profile e2−i
or against e3−i. For any other action profile, 0 is the unique best response. Thus any sample
against which i can optimally choose 1 must contain a sufficient number of e2−i or e
3
−i. Consider
first samples that do not contain e3−i. Specifically, consider a sample taken by player i ∈ N1
that contains e2−i for t times, e
1
−i for k− t− s times, and s others (excluding e3−i). If i is a first
exitor, each 1 in e2−i (there are n1 − 1 of them) is a mistake, and each of the “other s” profiles
contains at least one mistake. Thus one obtains the minimum number of mistakes by solving
the following integer program. Note that 1 is a best response against the sample if and only if
the constraint of the program is satisfied:
min (n1 − 1)t+ s, subject to tai + (k − t)ci ≥ kdi. (A.1)
The constraint in (A.1) is equivalent to
t ≥ k(di − ci)
ai − ci =
kεi
ai − di + εi .
For sufficiently small εi, t = 1 and s = 0 is a feasible solution of (A.1). Thus, for samples
without e3−i, the minimum number of mistakes is n1 − 1. It is clear that for samples with e3−i,
the number of mistakes exceeds n1 − 1. Thus ri(e1, N1) = n1 − 1.
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Lemma A.1.(2). ri(e1, N2) = n− 1.
Proof. Recall that a player i ∈ N2 optimally plays action 1 only against e3−i. For any other
action profile, 0 is the unique best response. Thus any sample against which i can optimally
choose 1 must contain at least one e3−i. If i is a first exitor, each 1 in e
3
−i (there are n − 1 of
them) is a mistake. Thus ri(e1, N2) ≥ n− 1. To show the reverse inequality, consider a sample
taken by player i ∈ N2 that contains the action profile e1−i for k − 1 times and an e3−i. 1 is a
best response against the sample if and only if
ai + (k − 1)ci ≥ kdi, (A.2)
which is equivalent to
1 ≥ k(di − ci)
ai − ci =
kεi
ai − di + εi .
This inequality holds for sufficiently small εi. Therefore ri(e1, N2) ≤ n− 1.
Lemma A.1.(3). ri(e2, N1) = k.
Proof. Recall that a player i ∈ N1 optimally plays action 1 either against the action profile e2−i
or against e3−i. For any other action profile, 0 is the unique best response. Consider a sample
taken by player i ∈ N1 that contains the action profile e3−i for t times, e2−i for k − t− s times,
and s others. For i to optimally play 0 against this sample, there must be sufficient number of
“other” profiles. In fact, let us show that s = k. 0 is a best response against the sample if and
only if
kdi ≥ (k − t− s)ai + ta′i + sci,
where a′i = ui(C, n1 + n2 − 1). Since a′i ≥ ai, it is necessary that
kdi ≥ (k − s)ai + sci,
which is equivalent to
s ≥ k(ai − di)
ai − ci =
k(ai − di)
ai − di + εi .
When εi is sufficiently small, this implies that s ≥ k. Thus in order to optimally choose 0,
i ∈ N1 has to have a sample that consists entirely of “other” profiles. If i ∈ N1 is a first
exitor, any profile that is neither e2−i nor e
3
−i must contain at least one mistake. Therefore
ri(e2, N1) = k.
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Lemma A.1.(4). If n2 is large to exit from e2 for player i, then ri(e2, N2) > k for any
sufficiently small εi.
Proof. Recall that a player i ∈ N2 optimally plays action 1 only against e3−i. For any other
action profile, 0 is the unique best response. Thus any sample against which i can optimally
choose 1 must contain a sufficient number of e3−i. If i is a first exitor, each 1 in e
3
−i played by a
member in N2 is a mistake (there are n2−1 of them), and each of the “other s” profiles contains
at least one mistake. Consider a sample taken by player i ∈ N2 that contains the action profile
e3−i for t times, e
2
−i for k− t− s times, and s others. One can evaluate the minimum number of
mistakes by solving the following integer program. Note that 1 is a best response against this
sample if and only if the constraint of the following program is satisfied:
min (n2 − 1)t+ s, subject to tai + (k − t)ci ≥ (k − t− s)fi + (t+ s)di. (A.3)
The exact value of ri(e2, N2) is given by program (A.3) with integer constraint. Ignoring integer
constraint, the optimal value of (A.3) is less than or equal to ri(e2, N2). Thus it suffices to show
that the optimal value of (A.3) exceeds k. Note that when the objective function passes through
an optimal solution of (A.3), its intercept on s axis gives the optimum value of (A.3).
The constraint in (A.3) is equivalent to
s ≥ k(fi − ci)
fi − di −
(




Draw a horizontal t axis and a vertical s axis. In this coordinate, the boundary of constraint
(A.3) is a line that has a negative slope steeper than −1 and its intercept on s axis is above k.
See Figure 5. On the other hand, the slope of the objective function is −(n2− 1). Now assume
that n2 is large to exit from e2 for player i. There are two cases to consider.
(Figure 5 appears about here.)
Case 1 . n2 − 2 > ηi.
In this case,
n2 − 1 > ai − di + fi − di
fi − di .
Thus for any sufficiently small εi,
n2 − 1 ≥ ai − di + fi − ci
fi − di ,
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where ci = di − εi. Therefore the objective function is (weakly) steeper than the constraint
boundary. Thus (t, s) in Figure 5 is an optimum solution. Clearly, when the objective function
passes through (t, s), the intercept is above s, which in turn strictly exceeds k. Therefore
ri(e2, N2) > k.
Case 2 . n2 − 2 = ηi.
In this case,
n2 − 1 < ai − di + fi − ci
fi − di
for any εi > 0. Therefore the objective function is flatter than the constraint boundary. Thus
(αik, 0) in Figure 5 is the unique solution of (A.3), where
αik =
k(fi − ci)
ai − di + fi − ci .
When the objective function passes through (αik, 0), its equation is given by
s = −(n2 − 1)(t− αik) = −(n2 − 1)t+ (n2 − 1)αik.
Therefore it suffices to show that (n2 − 1)αi > 1. Since n2 − 2 = ηi, we have
(n2 − 1)(fi − di)
ai − di + fi − di = 1.
On the other hand, it follows from ai − di > 0 that
αi =
fi − ci
ai − di + fi − ci >
fi − di
ai − di + fi − di
for any εi > 0, where ci = di − εi. Hence (n2 − 1)αi > 1.
Lemma A.1.(5). If n2 is small to exit from e2 for player i, then for sufficiently large k,
(n2 − 1)αik ≤ ri(e2, N2) ≤ (n2 − 1) dαike < k.
Proof. Assume that n2 is small to exit from e2 for player i. Then,
n2 − 1 < ai − di + fi − ci
fi − di
for every εi > 0. Thus the slope of the objective function in (A.3) is flatter than that of the
constraint boundary. Similarly to Lemma A.1.(4), it suffices to evaluate program (A.3). Ignoring
integer constraint, the optimum solution is the intersection of the best response constraint and
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t (horizontal) axis. In Figure 5, it is denoted by (αik, 0). Thus the optimal value with integer
constraint is at least (n2 − 1)αik. Rounding αik gives dαike. Since dαike is an integer, the





ai − di + fi − di
)
< 1.









= (n2 − 1)αi + n2 − 1
k
< 1,
from which it follows that (n2 − 1) dαike < k.
Lemma A.1.(6). ri(e3, N1) = k.
Proof. Consider a sample taken by player i ∈ N1 that contains the action profile e2−i for t
times, e3−i for k− t− s times, and s others. Analogously to Lemma A.1.(3), one can show that
in order for an i ∈ N1 to optimally choose 0 against this sample it must consist entirely of
“other” profiles.
Lemma A.1.(7). If n2 is large to exit from e3 for player i, then ri(e3, N2) = k.
Proof. Recall that a player i ∈ N2 optimally plays action 1 only against e3−i. For any other
action profile, 0 is the unique best response. Consider a sample taken by player i ∈ N2 that
contains the action profile e2−i for t times, e
3
−i for k − t − s times, and s others. If i is a first
exitor, each 0 in e2−i played by a member in N2 is a mistake (there are n2 − 1 of them), and
each of the “other s” profiles contains at least one mistake. One can evaluate the minimum
number of mistakes by solving the following integer program. Note that 0 is a best response
against this sample if and only if the constraint of the following program is satisfied:
min (n2 − 1)t+ s, subject to tfi + (k − t)di ≥ (k − t− s)ai + (t+ s)ci. (A.4)
The constraint in (A.4) is equivalent to
s ≥ k(ai − di)
ai − ci −
(




(Figure 6 appears about here.)
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In the t-s coordinate, the boundary of constraint (A.4) is a line that has a negative slope steeper
than −1 and its intercept on s-axis is below k. See Figure 6. On the other hand, the slope of
the objective function is −(n2− 1). Now assume that n2 is large to exit from e3. Then we have
n2 − 1 ≥ ai − di + fi − di
ai − di .
Noting that fi − di > 0, it follows that
n2 − 1 > ai − di + fi − ci
ai − ci
for any εi > 0. Thus the objective function is steeper than the constraint boundary. Ignoring
integer constraint, the optimum solution is the intersection of the best response constraint and
the s (vertical) axis. Its s coordinate s is given by
s =
k(ai − di)
ai − ci =
k(ai − di)
ai − di + εi .
For sufficiently small εi, rounding s gives ri(e3, N2) = k.
Lemma A.1.(8). If n2 is small to exit from e3 for player i, then for sufficiently large k,
(n2 − 1)βik ≤ ri(e3, N2) ≤ (n2 − 1) dβike < k.
Proof. Similarly to Lemma A.1.(7), it suffices to evaluate program (A.4). Assume that n2 is
small to exit from e3 for i ∈ N2. Then
n2 − 1 < ai − di + fi − di
ai − di .
Therefore the objective function is flatter than the constraint boundary for sufficiently small
εi. Ignoring integer constraint, the optimum solution is the intersection of the best response
constraint and t (horizontal) axis. Its t coordinate is given by
βik =
k(ai − di)
ai − di + fi − ci .
Thus the optimal value with integer constraint is at least (n2−1)βik. Rounding βik gives dβike.





ai − di + fi − di
)
< 1.










from which it follows that (n2 − 1) dβike < k.
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Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2.(1). r(e1, e2) ≤ n1 and r(e1, e2) < r(e1, e3).
Proof. One can construct a path from e1 to e2 that has exactly n1 mistakes as follows. See
Figure 3. In the path depicted in the figure, players i = 1, . . . , n1 simultaneously choose action
1 by mistake on, say, date 1. On date 1 players i = n1 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2 optimally choose 0.
From date 2 on, every player samples the most recent k profiles, and plays optimally against
it. Clearly, the path moves into h(e2). Thus r(e1, e2) ≤ n1.
(Figure 7 appears about here.)
It remains to show that r(e1, e3) > r(e1, e2). If n1 = 2, Figure 7 shows that r(e1, e2) = 1.
In this case, it is clear that r(e1, e3) > 1. Thus we can assume that n1 ≥ 3. For the remaining
cases, it suffices to show that r(e1, e3) > n1, since we know by the preceding paragraph that
n1 ≥ r(e1, e2). Assume first that n2 ≥ 3, and consider a path from e1 to e3. If there is a first
exitor in N2, then by Lemma A.1.(2) the path contains at least n1 + n2 − 1 mistakes. Thus we
can assume that j ∈ N1 is a first exitor of the path, and that there is no first exitor in N2.
Assume that player i ∈ N2 optimally chooses 1 for the first time during the path on date τ ,
and that any other i′ ∈ N2 (i′ 6= i) optimally chooses 1 for the first time during the path no
earlier than date τ . Prior to date τ , there must be a date τ∗ on which e3−i is played. Every 1
chosen by i′ ∈ N2 (i′ 6= i) on date τ∗ is a mistake. There are n2 − 1 of them. On the other
hand, since j ∈ N1 is a first exitor, prior to date τ there is a date τ∗∗ on which e2−j or e3−j is
played. On date τ∗∗, every 1 chosen by j′ ∈ N1 (j′ 6= j) is a mistake. There are at least n1 − 1
of them. Thus, prior to date τ the path contains at least n1 +n2− 2 mistakes. This shows that
r(e1, e3) > n1 when n2 ≥ 3. Thus it remains to consider the case that n1 ≥ 3 and n2 = 2. To
deal with this case, we show the following.
Claim. Assume that n1 ≥ 3. Let σ be an action profile in which σi = 1 for every
i ∈ N1. Consider a path from e1 to σ such that each 1 chosen by i ∈ N1 in the “most
recent” σ is not a mistake. This path contains at least n1 mistakes by members of
N1.
For each i ∈ N1, let τi be the date on which i chooses 1 as a best response for
the first time during the path. Every 1 chosen by i prior to date τi is a mistake.
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−i is played. If
there are more than one such dates for i, let τ∗i be the earliest date. Now there are
two cases to consider. Assume first that there are two different players in N1, say i1
and i2, such that dates τ∗i1 and τ
∗
i2
are actually the same date, τ∗. In this case, the
play of date τ∗ is either e2 or e3, thus the path contains at least n1 mistakes. The
remaining case is that dates τ∗1 , . . . , τ∗n1 are all different. Assume that they appear
as τ∗1 < · · · < τ∗n1 . On date τ∗1 , there are at least n1 − 1 mistakes. On date τ∗2 , 1 by
player 1 may be a best response, but 1 by player 3, who exists since n1 ≥ 3, must
be a mistake. Thus the path contains at least n1 mistakes. This concludes the proof
of the claim.
Assume that n1 ≥ 3 and n2 = 2. We show that r(e1, e3) > n1. Assume that player n1 + 1 ∈
N2 = {n1 + 1, n1 + 2} optimally chooses 1 for the first time during the path on date τ , and
that n1 + 2 optimally chooses 1 for the first time during the path no earlier than date τ . Prior
to date τ , there must be a date τ∗ on which e3−(n1+1) is played. Then 1 chosen by n1 + 2 on
date τ∗ is a mistake. Thus there is at least one mistake by members of N2. On date τ∗, every
i ∈ N1 chooses 1. Let γ be the number of best responses among 1s chosen by i ∈ N1 on date
τ∗. There are three cases to consider. First, if γ = 0, then date τ∗ contains n1 mistakes by
members of N1. Together with the mistake by n1 +2, date τ∗ contains n1 +1 mistakes. Second,
let n1 > γ ≥ 1. Then date τ∗ contains n1 − γ mistakes by members of N1. Since γ ≥ 1, prior
to date τ∗ there are at least n1 − 1 mistakes by members of N1. Hence, up to date τ∗, there
are at least n1 − γ + n1 − 1 mistakes by members of N1. Together with the mistake by n1 + 2,
the path contains at least n1 − γ + n1 > n1 mistakes. Finally, let γ = n1. In this case, Claim
1 implies that the path contains at least n1 mistakes by members of N1. Together with the
mistake by n1 + 2, the path contains at least n1 + 1 mistakes.
Lemma 5.2.(2). r(e2, e1) = r(e2).
Proof. Assume first that n2 is large to exit from e2. In this case, r(e2) = k by Lemma 5.1.(1).
In addition, n2 ≥ 3. Consider the following path from e2. The path consists of phases 1 and 2.
Denote the date τ action of player i by στi . See Figure 8.
(Figure 8 appears about here.)
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Phase 1 (τ = 1, . . . , k): Every player samples e2−i k times from h(e
2). Every player i 6= n1 + 1
optimally responds to the sample. Let στn1+1 = 1 for τ = 1, . . . , k.
Phase 2 (τ = k + 1, . . . , 2k): Every player samples (σ1−i, . . . , σ
k
−i), and optimally responds to
it. Then στi = 0 for every i ∈ N . Note, in particular, that στi = 0 for every i = n1 +
2, . . . , n1 + n2 since n2 ≥ 3.
Clearly, the path moves into h(e1). During this path, mistakes are those 1s by player n1 + 1 in
phase 1. There are k of them. Thus r(e2, e1) = k.
Assume next that n2 is small to exit from e2. Then we have r(e2) = mini∈N2 ri(e2, N2) by
Lemma 5.1.(2). Assume that r(e2) = rn1+1(e
2, N2). Recall from the proof of Lemma A.1.(5)
that rn1+1(e
2, N2) is the optimal value of program (A.3) with integer constraints. Let (t∗, s∗)
be an optimal solution of (A.3).5 By the construction of (A.3), it follows that when player
n1 + 1 samples e3−n1+1 for t
∗ times, e2−n1+1 for k − t∗ − s∗ times, and others for s∗ times, her
best response is 1. Assume for the moment that n2 ≥ 3, and consider the following path from
e2. See Figure 9.
(Figure 9 appears about here.)
Phase 1 (τ = 1, . . . , k): Every player samples e2−i k times from h(e
2). From τ = 1 to k− t∗−s∗,
every player optimally responds to the sample. From τ = k − t∗ − s∗ + 1 to k − t∗, every
player i 6= n1 + 2 continues to respond to the sample optimally. Let στn1+2 = 1. From
τ = k− t∗ + 1 to k, every player i = 1, . . . , n1, n1 + 1 continues to respond to the sample
optimally. For player i = n1 + 2, . . . , n1 + n2, let στi = 1.
Phase 2 (τ = k + 1, . . . , 2k): Every player samples (σ1−i, . . . , σ
k
−i), and optimally responds to
it. Then στi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n1. By construction, σ
τ
i = 0 for i = n1 + 2, . . . , n1 +n2 and
στn1+1 = 1.
Phase 3 (τ = 2k + 1, . . . , 3k): Every player samples (σk+1−i , . . . , σ
2k
−i), and optimally responds
to it. Then στi = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , n1 + 1. Since n2 ≥ 3, στi = 0 for every i =
n1 + 2, . . . , n1 + n2 as well.
Clearly, the path moves into h(e1). During this path, mistakes are those 1s by players i = n1 +
2, . . . , n1 +n2 in phase 1. There are (n2−1)t∗+s∗ of them. Therefore r(e2, e1) = (n2−1)t∗+s∗.
5That is, (n2 − 1)t∗ + s∗ = rn1+1(e2, N2) = r(e2), and both t∗ and s∗ are nonnegative integers.
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Finally, let n2 = 2. Consider the path in Figure 9 again. In phase 3, if n2 = 2 then στn1+2 = 1
and στi = 0 for every i 6= n2 + 2. Add phase 4 in which everyone samples (σ2k+1−i , . . . , σ3k−i), to
which everyone optimally responds. In this way, the path moves into h(e1).
Lemma 5.2.(3). r(e3, e1) = r(e3).
Proof. Assume first that n2 is large to exit from e3. Then r(e3) = k by Lemma 5.1.(3). In
addition, n2 ≥ 3. In this case, the path in Figure 10 shows that r(e3, e1) = k. Thus assume that
n2 is small to exit from e3. Then we have r(e3) = mini∈N2 ri(e3, N2) by Lemma 5.1.(4). Assume
that r(e3) = rn1+1(e
3, N2). Recall from the proof of Lemma A.1.(8) that rn1+1(e
3, N2) is the
optimal value of program (A.4) with integer constraints. Let (t∗, s∗) be an optimal solution of
(A.4). By the construction of (A.4), it follows that when player n1 + 1 samples e2−n1+1 for t
∗
times, e3−n1+1 for k − t∗ − s∗ times, and others for s∗ times, her best response is 0. Consider
the following path that starts from e3. See Figure 11.
(Figure 10 appears about here.)
(Figure 11 appears about here.)
Phase 1 (τ = 1, . . . , k): Every player samples e3−i k times from h(e
3). From τ = 1 to k− t∗−s∗,
every player optimally responds to the sample. From τ = k − t∗ − s∗ + 1 to k − t∗, every
player i 6= n1 + 2 continues to respond to the sample optimally. For player i = n1 + 2, let
στi = 0. From τ = k − t∗ + 1 to k, every player i = 1, . . . , n1, n1 + 1 continues to respond
to the sample optimally. For player i = n1 + 2, . . . , n1 + n2, let στi = 0.
Phase 2 (τ = k + 1, . . . , 2k): Every player samples (σ1−i, . . . , σ
k
−i), and optimally responds to
it. Then στi = 1 for every i = 1, . . . , n1. By construction, σ
τ
1 = 1 for every i = n1 +
2, . . . , n1 + n2 and στn1+1 = 0.
Phase 3 (τ = 2k + 1, . . . , 3k): Every player samples (σk+1−i , . . . , σ
2k
−i), and optimally responds to
it. Then στi = 0 for every i 6= n1 + 1 and στn1+1 = 1.
Phase 4 (τ = 3k + 1, . . . , 4k): Every player samples (σ2k+1−i , . . . , σ
3k
−i), and optimally responds
to it. Then στi = 0 for every i ∈ N (Phase 4 is not depicted in Figure 11).
Clearly, the path moves into h(e1). During this path, mistakes are those 0s by players i =
n1 + 2, . . . , n1 + n2 in phase 1. There are (n2 − 1)t∗ + s∗ of them. Therefore r(e3, e1) = (n2 −
1)t∗+s∗ = rn1+1(e3, N2) = r(e3). Note that the path in Figure 11 does work even if n2 = 2.
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Lemma 5.2.(4). If n2 is large to exit from e2, then r(e2, e3) > k.
Proof. Assume that n2 is large to exit from e2. Thus n2 ≥ 3. Take any exiting path from e2 to
e3. If there is an i ∈ N2 who is a first exitor of this path, then this path contains more than
k mistakes by Lemma A.1.(4). Thus assume that there is no first exitor in N2. Let i∗ ∈ N2 be
a first player in N2 who chooses 1 as a best response during the path. Prior to the date, say
date τ , on which i∗ optimally chooses 1 for the first time, at least one e3−i∗ appears in the path.
Fix such an e3−i∗ , denote the date on which this e
3
−i∗ occurs by τ
′. By the choice of i∗, every
1 chosen by i ∈ N2 (i 6= i∗) in this e3−i∗ is a mistake. There are n2 − 1 of them. On the other
hand, since i∗ is not a first exitor, prior to date τ there is an i∗∗ ∈ N1 who chooses 0 as a best
response. It follows from Lemma A.1.(3) (and its proof) that prior to date τ there are k dates
on each of which at least one mistake is made. If date τ ′ is not one of these “k dates,” then the
path contains at least k + n2 − 1 mistakes prior to date τ . If date τ ′ is one of these “k dates,”
one of the n2 − 1 mistakes may be counted as one of k mistakes, but still at least k + n2 − 2
mistakes has been made prior to date τ . In either case, the number of mistakes exceeds k since
n2 ≥ 3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3
To prove Theorem 5.3, we need the following lemma.
Lemma A.2.
(1) If n2 is small to exit from e2, then k > (n2 − 1) dαke+ n2 for sufficiently large k.
(2) r(e1, e3) ≤ r(e1, e2) + n2.
(3) r(e3, e1) ≤ (n2 − 1) dβke.
Proof. (1) By Lemma 5.1.(2), 1 > (n2 − 1)α. Therefore for sufficiently large k,
1 > (n2 − 1)α+ 2n2 − 1
k
,
or equivalently, k > (n2−1)(αk+1)+n2. The right hand side is larger than (n2−1) dαke+n2.
(2) Assume first that n1 ≥ 3. Then r(e1, e2) = n1 by the Claim in the proof of Lemma
5.2.(1) and Figure 3. Figure 12 shows that r(e1, e3) ≤ n1 +n2. Assume next that n1 = 2. Then
we know by Figure 7 that r(e1, e2) = 1. Now Figure 13 shows that r(e1, e3) ≤ 1 + n2.
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(Figure 12 appears about here.)
(Figure 13 appears about here.)
(3) If n2 is small to exit from e3, the conclusion follows from Lemma 5.1.(4) and 5.2.(3). If n2
is large to exit from e3, r(e3, e1) = k by Lemma 5.1.(3) and 5.2.(3). Thus it suffices to show that
(n2−1) dβke ≥ k. Let βi = β. If n2 is large to exit from e3, then, in the program (A.4) without
integer constraint, (0, s) is an optimal solution and (βik, 0) is a feasible solution (see Figure 6).
Therefore (n2−1)βik ≥ k(ai−di)/(ai−ci). Since dβike ≥ βik, (n2−1) dβike ≥ k(ai−di)/(ai−ci).
By monotonicity of d·e,






For sufficiently small εi, the right hand side is equal to k. It is clear that the left hand side is
equal to (n2 − 1) dβike.




ai − di + fi − di > mini∈N2
fi − di
ai − di + fi − di .




ai − di + fi − ci > mini∈N2
fi − ci









where ci = di − εi. This implies β > α+ (1 + n2n2−1)/k, and thus βk > dαke+ n2/(n2 − 1). We
are going to show that this inequality and Lemma A.2.(1) constitute a sufficient condition for
e3 to be stochastically stable.
Since n2 is small to exit from e2, r(e2, e1) ≤ (n2 − 1) dαke by Lemma 5.1.(2) and 5.2.(2).
On the other hand, r(e1, e3) ≤ r(e1, e2) + n2 by Lemma A.2.(2). Therefore
ρ(T8) ≤ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1) dαke+ n2.
By Lemma 5.4, it suffices to show that T8 dominates T5. Assume first that n2 is small to exit
from e3. Then by Lemma 5.1.(4), r(e3, e1) ≥ (n2 − 1)βk. Thus
ρ(T5) ≥ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1)βk.
Therefore e3 is uniquely stochastically stable if
ρ(T5)− ρ(T8) ≥ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1)βk − (r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1) dαke+ n2)
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= (n2 − 1)βk − (n2 − 1) dαke − n2 > 0.
The last inequality is equivalent to βk > dαke + n2/(n2 − 1). Assume next that n2 is large
to exit from e3. Then by Lemma 5.1.(3), r(e3, e1) ≥ k. Similarly to the above, e3 is uniquely
stochastically stable if k − (n2 − 1) dαke − n2 > 0, which is equivalent to Lemma A.2.(1).
For (2), assume that mini 1/(1 + ηi) > mini ηi/(1 + ηi). Then, similarly to (1), αk > dβke
for small εi and large k. Thus it suffices to show that the last inequality is a sufficient condition
for e2 to be stochastically stable.
By Lemma A.2.(3), r(e3, e1) ≤ (n2 − 1) dβke. Thus
ρ(T5) ≤ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1) dβke .
By Lemma 5.4, it suffices to show that T5 dominates T7 and T8. Since n2 is small to exit
from e2, Lemma 5.1.(2) implies that r(e2, ej) ≥ (n2 − 1)αk for j = 1, 3. On the other hand,
r(e1, e3) > r(e1, e2) by Lemma 5.2.(1). Thus
min{ρ(T7), ρ(T8)} ≥ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1)αk.
Therefore e2 is uniquely stochastically stable if
min{ρ(T7), ρ(T8)} − ρ(T5) ≥ r(e1, e2) + (n2 − 1)αk − r(e1, e2)− (n2 − 1) dβke
= (n2 − 1)(αk − dβke) > 0.
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Figures
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k−t∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ t∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · ·
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · ·
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · ·
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1 · · ·
σn1+2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · ·
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ...
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · ·
Figure 1: An exit from e2 via direct transition.
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · ·
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ... ... · · ·
σn1−1 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · ·
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 0∗ · · · 0∗ 0 · · ·
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 1 · · ·
σn1+2 0 · · · 0 1∗ 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ... ... · · ·
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 1∗ 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
Figure 2: An exit from e2 via indirect transition.
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m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ...
σn1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0























































































































































































































































Figure 6: Program ri(e3, N2).
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 0 1 · · · 1
σ2 0 · · · 0 0 1 1 · · · 1
σ2+1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... · · · ...
σ2+n2 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
Figure 7: A path from e1 to e2 when n1 = 2.
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h(e2) Phase 1 Phase 2
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · · 0
σn1+2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
Figure 8: A path from e2 to e1 when n2 is large to exit from e2.
h(e2)
Phase 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ Phase 2 Phase 3
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k−t∗−s∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ s∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ t∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
σn1+3 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1∗ · · · 1∗ 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
Figure 9: A path from e2 to e1 when n2 is small to exit from e2.
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h(e3) Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
σn1+1 1 · · · 1 0∗ · · · 0∗ 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+2 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
Figure 10: A path from e3 to e1 when n2 is large to exit from e3.
h(e3)
Phase 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ Phase 2 Phase 3
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k−t∗−s∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ s∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ t∗︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1
σn1+2 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0∗ · · · 0∗ 0∗ · · · 0∗ 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
σn1+3 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0∗ · · · 0∗ 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0∗ · · · 0∗ 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
Figure 11: A path from e3 to e1 when n2 is small to exit from e3.
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m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ...
σn1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
σn1+1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
...
... · · · ... ... ... · · · ...
σn1+n2 0 · · · 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
Figure 12: A path from e1 to e3 with n1 + n2 mistakes.
m︷ ︸︸ ︷ k︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ1 0 · · · 0 1∗ 0 1 1 · · · 1
σ2 0 · · · 0 0 1 1 1 · · · 1
σ2+1 0 · · · 0 0 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
...
... · · · ... ... ... ... ... · · · ...
σ2+n2 0 · · · 0 0 0 1∗ 1 · · · 1
Figure 13: A path from e1 to e3 when n1 = 2.
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